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1. Neanderthal data and Neanderthal perspectives 
 
Lluís Barceló-Coblijn and Antonio Benítez-Burraco (2013; henceforth BB13) have 
provided some insightful comments on and pertinent criticisms of my previous 
article ‘The talking Neanderthals’ (Johansson 2013; henceforth J13). 
 First, I appreciate their kind words about my review of the evidence. It 
appears that we largely agree on the facts of the matter, and also that we agree on 
the main conclusion of J13, that, as they express it, “Neanderthals had to count on 
some form of language” (BB13: 199). Our disagreements are more a matter of 
perspective, interpretation, and methodology. BB13 have two main criticisms: 
 
(1)  They believe it is possible to infer “that the Neanderthal language was not 
like AMH’s [anatomically modern human’s] because it lacked modern 
syntax” (BB13: 199–200, original emphasis), and imply that I am too timid 
in refraining from drawing that conclusion in J13. 
 
(2)  They disagree with my interpretation or methodology on a number of 
specific points throughout J13. 
 
 It is also interesting to read J13 and BB13 in the light of another recent re-
view of the same topic by Dediu & Levinson (2013), published shortly after BB13. 
Dediu & Levinson reach largely the same conclusions as J13 (but along slightly 
different routes) and go one step further in that they (like BB13) do take a stand 
on whether Neanderthals had modern language. But their conclusion is the op-
posite from BB13: Neanderthals did have “essentially modern language” (Dediu 
& Levinson 2013: 1). 
 
2. On language, communication, and productive debates 
 
As BB13 now concede the presence of “some form of language” in Neanderthals, 





work” (BB13: 200), they apparently accept a non-monolithic language concept. 
But it is clear from their section 2.1 that we do not fully agree on the details, 
though it is less clear precisely what their language concept looks like. 
 Within this non-monolithic framework, BB13 still give a privileged place to 
AMH language, and find interest in Neanderthal language only as it relates to 
AMH language: “[T]he real productive debate is whether or not Neanderthals 
had the same faculty of language that [AMHs] have” (BB13: 199, emphasis in 
original) and “what is really worth characterizing is the proto-typical AMH lang-
uage, and then to determine whether or not Neanderthals could have developed 
something like this” (BB13: 201). I agree that this is an interesting question. But I 
do not agree that this is the only interesting question, or even “the real productive 
debate” concerning Neanderthal language. Evaluating Neanderthal language 
solely on whether they match AMH or not is too flavored with scala naturae, with 
us as the pinnacle of creation, for my taste. Neanderthals, and the Neanderthal 
language faculty, are well worth studying in their own right, not just as poor 
relatives of AMHs. 
 If the Neanderthal language faculty were the same as the AMH language 
faculty, this would not tell us much new about the computational structures of 
language — but it would have far-ranging implications for the study of language 
evolution, falsifying a long list of AMH-specific hypotheses of language origins.  
 On the other hand, if the Neanderthal language faculty were different, as 
BB13 contend, and given that we already agree that they did have some form of 
language, and thus a language faculty, this would show that there is more than 
one way to build a language faculty. Such a discovery could catalyze fruitful 
investigations into possible alternative structures of language faculties, today 
overshadowed by our focus on the AMH language faculty. 
 The choice of null hypothesis is a key issue here (cf. section 2.4 in J13). BB13 
state that “… we actually can proceed with a null hypothesis: In our opinion, 
current evidence supports that the Neanderthal language was not like AMH’s 
because it lacked modern syntax…” (BB13: 199–200). This sounds like they are 
positing their conclusion as null hypothesis, which skirts very close to the petitio 
principii fallacy, assuming your conclusion. Later, they state that “[i]n fact, it is 
our contention that the available data do not support non-AMH hominin ‘lang-
uages’ being syntactically structured like AMH languages are” (BB13: 201).1 I 
actually agree with this contention — but also with its complement, that the 
available data likewise do not support that non-AMH languages are not 
structured like AMH languages. As I said in J13, “whether they had syntactic 
language can be neither confirmed nor refuted.” (p. 23). In the absence of evi-
dence, the null hypothesis becomes the conclusion by default. There are several 
statements in BB13 where they reiterate their assumption that AMH language is 
unique among hominins, notably in their conclusions at the end; but nowhere in 
BB13 can I find any actual positive evidence supporting this assumption (as op-
posed to a lack of evidence to the contrary). 
 On syntax, I can concede that I did not define it carefully enough in J13. 
                                                 
    1  The scare quotes on ‘languages’ here seem to contradict their earlier statement that 
“Neanderthals had to count on some form of language” (BB13: 199). Did Neanderthals, in 
the opinion of BB13, have language or ‘language’? 




Instead of going into a full discussion here of all the complexities of this issue, I 
will in the interest of brevity simply state that I largely agree with the model 
posited by Jackendoff & Wittenberg (in press); see also Johansson (2005). This 
circumvents, among other things, the false dichotomy that BB13 raises between 
syntax in the loose sense ‘to put in order’ and in the strong sense of modern 
AMH syntax. 
 Concerning lexical semantics, there are indeed many current theories on 
lexicon structure, another issue that I will abstain from discussing here at the 
length it properly deserves. Suffice to say that most people agree that modern 
language contains some kind of trilateral mappings between form, meaning, and 
syntactic features. There are various frameworks for describing this mapping, 
including both frameworks that don’t call it ‘lexicon’ at all, and frameworks that 
give primacy to the lexicon over syntax (e.g., Boeckx 2013), but I will leave that 
aside; some way of connecting form and meaning, and plugging it into syntax, is 
required for modern language. Removing one of the three sides of the trilateral 
mappings leaves something that one may or may not wish to call a lexicon, but it 
is not logically incoherent; it is simply a bilateral mapping. Boeckx (2013) appa-
rently argues for an early stage in language evolution with bilateral mapping 
connecting syntax with meaning, lacking the externalization (‘form’) mapping. I 
would instead argue for the possibility of a bilateral mapping with form and 
meaning (cf. Jackendoff & Wittenberg, in press); such a bilateral mapping, freely 
extensible, is the minimum required for me to call something ‘language’. I con-
cede the logical possibility (if not the plausibility; see Johansson, in preparation) 
of the scenario of Boeckx (2013), but would not call it language. 
 Ape ‘language’ (Kanzi et al.) is invoked by BB13 in an apparent attempt at a 
reductio ad absurdum of my language definition, both concerning syntax and 
lexical semantics. This reductio fails on several points: (1) it works as a reductio 
only if ape language is inherently absurd, which it is only if language in all forms 
is assumed a priori to be unique to humans, (2) apes do not display these 
language-like behaviors in the wild, only when taught by humans,2 (3) there is 
scant evidence that apes do any (proto-)lexical mapping on their own, beyond 
those mappings provided by humans, and (4) the productive ‘syntax’ displayed 
in ape utterances fits only a very loose definition of syntax, much looser than the 
one I adopt from Jackendoff & Wittenberg (in press). 
 The issue that BB13 raise concerning function versus structure (p. 202) is 
not a productive debate. It is a fallacy to place questions of structure and function 
in opposition — instead they are complementary questions, belonging to differ-
ent levels in Tinbergen’s (1963) classification of explanations in biology. The 
function and the structure of a biological feature, such as language, are both 
interesting questions, and neither should be neglected in a proper biolinguistic 
analysis, nor should either be given primacy over the other. With that said, there 
are methodological considerations involved in inferring structures and functions 
in extinct species, that BB13 do not fully take into account. To put it briefly and 
simply: Only structures that fossilize can be studied directly; functions may be 
                                                 
    2  Why apes have a capacity to learn language-like behaviors, a capacity that is to all 





inferred either from fossilizable structures, or from behavioral traces; non-
fossilizable structures, such as computational devices, can only be inferred 
indirectly through the behavioral traces produced by their functioning. Even for 
modern humans, where we have full access to both behavior and soft tissue, 
there is still no consensus on the structure of the computational device behind 
language.3 For this reason, the emphasis of BB13 on the evolutionary trajectory of 
this computational device, ahead of function, is misplaced, as this is effectively 
unknowable without going through functional inferences that are difficult and 
contentious even in living humans. 
 
3. Interpretative and methodological issues  
3.1 Globular or lateral brains?  
Concerning the neural substrate of language, BB13 first invoke allometry and the 
structural changes that may follow from size changes. This is highly relevant 
when comparing for example the brains of humans and chimpanzees, as it is a 
non-trivial issue to disentangle which structural differences are just byproducts 
of the threefold size difference. But as there is no significant difference in size 
between Neanderthal and AMH brains,4 allometry does not contribute anything 
informative to the issue at hand. The average brain development trajectory , as 
invoked by BB13, may indeed be different (Gunz et al. 2012), though this issue is 
not totally settled yet. But it remains to be shown whether this difference is 
relevant for language. As noted by Benítez-Burraco (2013), language ontogeny in 
AMH is highly robust against perturbations, presumably including the full range 
of development trajectories of AMH, and there is no evidence that this robusticity 
does not extend to the Neanderthal pattern. 
 The argument from globularity of Boeckx (2012) is more interesting, as it 
focuses on the main difference between Neanderthal and AMH skulls (and 
presumably brains), the more globular shape of AMH skulls. But while the idea 
is intriguing and well worth pursuing further, especially in connection with 
developmental patterns, at present the proposed link from globularity to 
language is purely speculative and cannot warrant any conclusions concerning 
Neanderthal language. 
 On lateralization, I do not see any major disagreements between J13 and 
BB13. As is clearly stated in J13, the proposed link between handedness and 
language is not strongly supported, and cannot stand on its own as evidence of 
language. But I think BB13 are overstating their case for continuity somewhat; 
while lateralization in various respects is indeed ubiquitous and ancient among 
many animals (not just mammals), the population-level handedness ratio of 
humans is not.5 
                                                 
    3  Nor is there consensus on whether the primary function of language is communication or 
something else, though the vast majority of language-evolution researchers work on com-
municative hypotheses. But in the interest of brevity I will leave that debate for a different 
day (Johansson, in preparation). 
    4  If anything, the Neanderthal average brain size is slightly larger than that of AMH. But the 
difference is slight, and all known Neanderthals are well within the AMH size range. 
    5  Whether there is any population-level handedness among other apes remains a contentious 
issue (J13: 47, fn. 7). Hopkins and associates, cited by BB13, are just one side of that debate. 




3.2  On linguistic genotypes  
On the genetic issues, there is again little disagreement between me and BB13 on 
substantial issues, but much disagreement on interpretation. 
 Concerning FOXP2, as noted also by BB13 this is a gene with both sequence 
and physiological role highly conserved, certainly among mammals and likely 
among vertebrates.  
 Concerning other possibly language-related genetic changes in the human 
lineage, Dediu & Levinson (2013) review these in more detail than either J13 or 
BB13. In the interest of brevity I will not go through the whole list here, but 
instead just state that I largely agree with the analysis of Dediu & Levinson. 
Worth mentioning is just the work of Maricic et al. (2013), cited by both BB13 and 
Dediu & Levinson (2013), according to which a regulatory region of FOXP2 has 
changed in AMH but not Neanderthals. What Dediu & Levinson (2013) but not 
BB13 mention is that Maricic et al. (2013) find the ancestral allele present at a fre-
quency of about 10% in some modern African populations. If this change made a 
key difference with respect to language, the effect on language in these 
populations ought to be obvious. 
 The statement of BB13 that “even if they [Neanderthals] were endowed 
with the same ‘linguistic genotype’ […], we cannot automatically rule out the 
possibility that the former had a different faculty of language” is not supported 
by the argument of Benítez-Burraco (2013) that language development is highly 
robust in humans, also against variations in the ‘linguistic genotype’: “In parti-
cular, we argue that developmental dynamics (and hence, an assorted set of regu-
latory factors) strongly canalizes variation, to the extent that the same phenotype 
can robustly emerge at the term of growth from diverse genotypes” (Benítez-
Burraco 2013: 1). It is technically true that different outcomes from the same 
genotype cannot be ruled out — in some contexts this is even fairly common, in-
fluenced by environmental cues (cf. West-Eberhard 2003). But language develop-
ment of AMHs is clearly highly robust against variation in the external environ-
ment, with AMH babies throughout history developing normal AMH language 
faculties despite a range of environmental variation that encompasses and 
exceeds the typical environment of Neanderthals. What remains is the possibility 
that the ‘internal environment’ in the child during ontogeny differs systemati-
cally in Neanderthals in ways that go beyond the robusticity limits of language 
development; it is unknown whether this is actually the case, and pure specu-
lation either to assume that it is or that it isn’t.  
3.3 Introgression among strawmen  
In their section 2.4, BB13 say they are arguing against section 5 of J13. However, 
the position that they are apparently attacking is nowhere to be found in J13. 
 Their statements — “[h]ence, one cannot take granted that Neanderthals 
automatically had full language” (p. 205) and “[h]owever, our main criticism 
against any relevant role of the interbreeding fact in granting Neanderthals a 
modern faculty of language is of quite different nature” (p. 206) — indicate that 
BB13 are arguing against someone who believes that interbreeding proves that 





where this conclusion explicitly is not drawn, notably in the two sentences 
quoted by BB13 on their page 205, repeated here in full from J13 (p. 18): 
“Evidence of successful interbreeding would thus add some modest weight to 
the case for Neanderthal language, despite some caveats about heterozygotes 
and mating systems. But it is not clear what form of language is supported.” The 
second sentence in the quote makes it abundantly clear that J13 does not jump to 
the conclusion that Neanderthals had full modern language, but instead leaves 
the issue open. It is also explicitly stated in J13: “[W]hen I talk about ‘some form 
of language’, this includes proto-language” (p. 7), but in several places BB13 are 
arguing as if “language” in J13 means full modern language. BB13 are criticizing 
a strawman here, possibly caused by misreading how I use the word “language” 
in J13. 
 Another strawman is erected in the final paragraph of section 2.4 in BB13. 
Here they are apparently arguing against a claim that introgression from AMHs 
to Neanderthals transferred ‘language genes’ to the Neanderthal population, 
giving them language. I fail to see how anybody could possibly misunderstand 
J13 as making such a claim. Possibly Benítez-Burraco (2012), where the same 
counterargument appears, is contaminating their reading of J13? 
 Concerning North Africans (BB13: 205, fn. 8), their point is technically cor-
rect, but irrelevant. I wrote “Africans” as shorthand for “Sub-Saharan Africans” 
(J13: 17), which was admittedly sloppy, but the status of North Africans 
(Sánchez-Quinto et al. 2012) has no impact on the argument of J13, which does 
not hinge on the specific AMH populations possibly affected by introgression. 
 BB13 are quite correct in noting that introgression is common in the animal 
world, and I would not be surprised if AMH and Neanderthals did interbreed. 
But BB13 jump to conclusions too quickly when they treat interbreeding between 
AMH and Neanderthals as if it were a proven fact. The case for interbreeding is 
still not robust enough for categorical statements like “Neanderthals and AMHs 
interbred” (BB13: 205) or “the interbreeding fact” (BB13: 206), even though some 
further indirect support exists from, for example, Yotova et al. (2011).6  
3.4  To knot, or not to knot?  
On the ‘symbolic’ archeology, I see no major disagreements, except the issues of 
structure vs. function and language sensu J13 vs. language sensu BB13 already 
discussed earlier. 
 When it comes to alleged archeological proxies for syntax, however, our 
conclusions differ substantially. As noted by BB13, the attempt by Camps and 
associates (Camps & Uriagereka 2006; Balari et al. 2012) to tie a knot between 
knots and syntax is given rather short shrift in J13. This is not only because I find 
the knot-syntax connection per se unconvincing (cf. Lobina 2012; Lobina & 
Brenchley 2012), but also because it would be uninformative with respect to 
Neanderthal language even if it were established that a knot is a proxy for 
syntax. As noted in J13, we have no direct evidence of knot-making among 
Neanderthals. But we do have indirect evidence in the form of technologies — 
hafting (e.g., Cârciumaru et al. 2012), clothing (e.g., Wales 2012), and possibly 
                                                 
    6  Incidentally, Yotova et al. use the same ”African” shorthand for which BB13 berate J13. 




pendants (e.g., Zilhão et al. 2010) — that typically involve knots, so it would be 
imprudent to assume that a Neanderthal couldn’t tie a knot, and unwarranted to 
conclude from this that they had no modern syntax. 
 The various connections between language and the motor system invoked 
by BB13 in this context are unobjectionable in themselves. But BB13 fail to show 
how these points tie into the knot-syntax argument. A general language-motor tie 
is not evidence of a specific knot-syntax connection. 
 Otherwise, I have considerable sympathy for the hypothesis that the 
computational machinery behind language is not domain-specific, but used for 
computations in many areas, be it tool use (cf. Barceló-Coblijn & Gomila 2012), 
navigation (cf. Kinsella 2009), music (cf. Asano 2013), or whatever. I am just not 
convinced that actual knot-tying (as opposed to doing knot theory) is one of 
those areas.  
3.5 Who is dynamic, and who is static?  
In support of the knot notion, BB13 invoke the cultural dynamism of AMH. How 
knotting causes dynamism is not shown, but the issue of cultural dynamism is 
interesting in its own right, with or without knots, and I thank BB13 for pointing 
this out, as J13 did not give it enough attention. 
 By ‘cultural dynamism’ I presume that BB13 mean the much more rapid 
rate of cultural and technological change, and the cumulative effects of such 
change, in some human populations compared with earlier hominids. This 
difference in rate is certainly real when comparing Homo with other extant apes, 
among whom the rate of cumulative cultural change is indistinguishable from 
zero. And even in Homo erectus the rate is very modest, with a recognizably 
Acheulean tool kit changing very gradually over a million years or so. But during 
the last few hundred thousand years, the situation is more complex. Compared 
with today’s Western culture, the rate of change remained glacial well into the 
Holocene — but compared with any previous population, it accelerated dra-
matically, both among early AMHs and among other contemporary humans, 
including Neanderthals. In the last 50,000 years, further acceleration took place 
among some, but not all, populations of both AMHs and Neanderthals. On one 
hand, the Châtelperronian shows the accelerating cultural dynamism of a subset 
of Neanderthals (see, e.g., Soressi et al. 2013 for one recent piece of evidence) — 
and on the other hand, the recognizable continuity of San culture back to 44,000 
years ago (d’Errico et al. 2012) shows that not all AMH populations accelerated in 
the same way. Cultural dynamism is an issue that clearly deserves more attention 
as a proxy for cognitive evolution, and most recent AMHs are indeed more 
dynamic than most Neanderthals — but it is far from a clear-cut case of all AMHs 
being dynamic and all non-AMHs static. 
 It is also interesting to note that BB13 invoke differences in working mem-
ory (Coolidge & Wynn 2005) as an explanation for the difference in dynamism. 
This is a defensible, if speculative, hypothesis — but working memory is part of 
the performance system, well outside the core language systems, and the 
dynamism issue would in that case not support any difference in core syntax 






4. Summing up: Stringent, stringenter, stringentest 
 
Both J13 and BB13 agree on the basic methodological issue that we should not 
seek a single “magic bullet” proof of language, but instead look at the total 
pattern formed by all the various proxies and other types of evidence available. 
Likewise, we both agree that our own implementation of this methodology is the 
proper stringent one, and in the other paper it is done wrong. 
 But I also believe that BB13 in their Section 3 are barking up the wrong 
methodological tree. Our different conclusions do not really hinge on differences 
in how we apply the pattern-forming methodology that we have in common. 
Instead our key differences are two:  
(1)  What, if anything, is the proper null hypothesis in Neanderthal studies? 
As discussed in section 2 above, BB13 posit a null hypothesis that, in the absence 
of positive evidence one way or the other, subsequently becomes their 
conclusion. I think it is methodologically more stringent to avoid petitio principii 
and refrain from conclusions in such a case.7 
(2)  Is language a monolithic integrated entity, or can there be different ways of having 
language?  
My position, here as well as in J13, is that we should not assume a priori that 
language faculties that are not identical to the AMH one are impossible. The 
position of BB13 on this issue is unclear, or possibly inconsistent; on one hand, 
they admit that Neanderthals had “some form of language” (p. 199) or “could 
have been endowed with regular-like grammars” (p. 210) but deny them full 
modern language, which entails that BB13 grant Neanderthals a language faculty 
different from the AMH one. On the other hand, in Section 3 they appear to be 
arguing that language is “an integrated entity” (p. 209) and “it is not so much a 
matter of when a component of language appeared, but, above all, of when all the 
components were put together” (p. 209, emphasis in original), which sounds 
more like an argument for a monolithic indivisible language faculty. And 
throughout their paper, as discussed in section 2 above, they argue as if the only 
issue were whether Neanderthals have an AMH language faculty or not, which 
likewise sounds as if they believe different language faculties are either 
impossible or irrelevant. 
 We agree that somewhere along the human lineage things happened that 
“improved the computational abilities” (BB13: 210) that are relevant for lang-
uage. But unlike BB13, I would argue that it remains to be shown both (i) 
whether this was a single step, or multiple steps, and (ii) whether the step(s) took 
place before or after the split between AMHs and Neanderthals. We agree that 
Neanderthals had some kind of language, and thus some kind of language 
faculty, which entails that at least some of the above-mentioned steps took place 
before the split. But for the reasons given throughout both J13 and this paper, I 
remain agnostic on how the language faculty that we agree that the Neanderthals 
did have compares with the AMH language faculty. 
                                                 
    7 I likewise believe that Dediu & Levinson (2013) are somewhat premature in jumping to the 
opposite conclusion from BB13.  
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